

The territorial dimension of anti-EU-voting in East-Central European countries

Essay by Jürgen Dieringer

(Professor, Vesalius College, Free University of Brussels)

1. Introduction

There is no doubt anymore that European integration affects national elections in EU member states (de Vries 2007). Modes and shapes of influence may, however, differ from country to country. This essay draws on the combination – or merger – of a new transnational cleavage with the Lipset/Rokkanian territorial cleavages “urban vs. rural” and “center vs. periphery”. The focus is on anti-EU-voting in Eastern- and Central European (ECE) countries, especially in Poland and Hungary.

Research detected the emergence of a transnational cleavage in Western societies, manifested in a pro/contra stance on European integration (Hooghe/Marks 2018). In this body of literature, the transnational dividing line partly replaces or at least alternates the traditional four cleavages of Lipset/Rokkan (1967). In my opinion, the transnational cleavage has strong explanatory value, but must not necessarily be detached from traditional cleavages, especially those with a territorial dimension (center vs. periphery and urban vs. rural). Instead, they merge or intermingle. The transnational cleavage could even be seen as a function or derivative of territorial cleavages. At the same time territorial cleavages present themselves as the geographical expression of a societal rift between those who profit from internationalization and those who are threatened by it.

Internationalization/globalization/Europeanization leads to – or fails to overcome – the decay of certain regions, especially of rural areas in the periphery and regions under structural change; this, then, has the potential to turn into anti-EU-voting. The territorial dimension of voter’s behavior shows a dividing line between those who surf the wave of globalization (the winners, located in the urban centers), and those from ‘places that don’t matter’ (Rodrigues-Pose 2017). I define ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ not in absolute terms, but in terms of relative distance to ‘others’, be they individuals, groups of persons or territorial units. What really matters, is decline. Inhabitants of declining areas seem to be more vulnerable to anti EU-voting, even if their personal situation is not worse than that of a comparable societal layer in regions catching-up. If the ratio of anti-EU voting, though, is not embedded in ‘welfare’ only – the hardships of making a every day’s living – the cultural dimension should matter, especially the construction of ‘Us’ (a perceived group, e.g. a nation) and ‘Them’ (the others). As a consequence, we have to search for a mixture of measurable ‘hard’ economic factors defining decline and correlate them with constructed images related to anti-EU voting. In my view, this mixture of political economic and political psychology draws the geographical map of anti-EU voting both in the Eastern and Western part of the EU.

2. Mapping the problem

Anti-EU voting¹ is not reduced to Eastern- and Central Europe. Quite to the contrary: The Front National in France, the FPÖ in Austria, Vlaams Belang in Belgium, UKIP in the UK, the Lega in Italy and many others play the ‘evil-Brussels-trumpet’ for quite some time. Even parties in government, partly embedded in major European party groups, articulate their anti-Europeanism referring to a more De Gaullean “Europe of the nation state”, thus contradicting the very idea of European integration with its unique selling points ‘supranationalism’ and ‘pooling of sovereignty’. In 2018, the existence of anti-EU parties is the norm in the EU-28, not the exception.

Until the turn of the millennium anti-EU sentiments were rather small between Tallinn and Sofia. However, the coercive power of EU-membership application conditionality ended with EU membership and the pro-EU consensus started to crumble. Decidedly anti-European populist parties, such as Jobbik in Hungary, entered the scene. Especially in the conservative camp forces able to produce parliamentary majorities like the Polish PiS referred to De Gaulle. In Hungary the rhetoric of Jobbik (the outsider) and FIDESZ (the major governing party) is hardly distinguishable, with Brussels being labeled the new Moscow. The Polish Kukiz’15 movement challenges PiS in this respect. The electoral success of such parties, especially FIDESZ in Hungary and PiS in Poland, is strongly contrasted by the populations’ view on Europe. 76% of the Poles (at the top end of the ECE countries, 3rd in the list) and 56% of Hungarians (at the low end, 24th) are ‘totally optimistic’ for the future of the EU.²

IR theory would explain growing anti-EU sentiment by devalued sovereignty of nation states, leading to a democracy deficit. The state gains capacity to solve bigger problems by joining forces with other European states (climate change, trade conflicts), but loses ground on the ability to solve smaller problems. In ECE nations states just recently regained their sovereignty, just to share it with other EU-members after accession. This issue, important for the mindsets of voters in the right specter, was rather hidden for some time, as anti-communism and the wish to belong to the “West” was dominant.³ When the rotten structures of neoliberal Western capitalism got deciphered in the multiple debt- and Euro-crises from 2008, ECE governments, so far more free-rider than in the driving seat in the EU, recognized the limits of national action. As a result, the famous game of Brussels-blaming established a narrative in which the EU was the major obstacle to problem-solving – and the EU failed to shape the debate in defense of the institutions.

3. Voter alignment and cleavage structure in ECE-countries

When Lipset/Rokkan (1967) published their study on party systems and voter alignments⁴, the party systems of the then EC-6 were overly stable – or ‘frozen’. Blue-collar workers without religious affiliation, living in an industrialized city, overwhelmingly voted “left”, a catholic farmer from of a rural area almost surely voted “right”. Volatility of voting was small, day-to-

¹ Anti-EU-voting here is understood as voting for parties or persons with a strong anti-EU or anti-Brussels rhetoric, no matter whether or not they are outside (like the Polish PiS) or inside (the Hungarian FIDESZ) the center of the party spectrum of the European Parliament (EPP, S&D, ALDE, and Greens).

² Special Eurobarometer 479, Future of Europe, October-November 2018 p. 31.

³ This does not mean that there is no Euroscepticism on the “left” (see e.g. Santana/Rama 2018), but it is way stronger on the “right”.


⁴ Lipset/Rokkan (1967) structured party preferences alongside four cleavages: 1) Owner vs. worker; 2) State vs. church; 3) Center vs. periphery; and 4) Urban vs. rural.

day politics could alter only a small percentage of voter's decision and party systems were stable. During the last decades of the former century the unfreezing process gained momentum and the explanatory value of cleavage theory decreased. Consequently, Marks/Wilson (2000: 435) define the original cleavages more as 'prisms' through which party politicians frame the political discourse. Marks/Wilson state, back in the year 2000 and with respect to the time period of the late 1990s and early 1990s, that voters do actually not see where their interests are rooted with respect to European integration, but the process of integration already produces winners and losers. The question arises: Are existing parties able to include the outcome of the European economic process into their discourse and their political positions? In many cases they obviously were not. The reality of the European economic process and the structure of traditional West European party systems got detached and mismatch occurred, unleashing centripetal forces.

The dominant trend towards the end of the second decade of the 21st century is the emergence of fragmented and fluid party systems. In some countries traditional party systems got blown up in a single election, e.g. in France, or got restructured by the voter several times, like in Italy. EU-Europe with its strong democratic- and rule of law-agenda (Art. 7 procedures, TEU) was challenged by the upcoming of populist movements, predominantly from the right. Those right-wing movements reflect, transport and enhance a multitude of frustrations, targeting foreigners and other minorities as scape goat for (often only perceived) problems, or/ans preserving a narrative rooted in pre-war fascism. The populist, sometimes proto-fascist parties of the new and the old right (Italy/Lega, Germany/AfD, UK/UKIP, Hungary/Jobbik, Finland/True Finns etc.) are quite similar in their rhetoric, in targeting political enemies and in the use of an instrumental tool kit beyond democratic traditions and conventions.

In the face of these tremendous challenges and changes Hooghe and Marks (2018) drew on the diminishing explanatory value of traditional cleavage literature by defining a transnational cleavage as the main axis of party competition, a 'GAL vs. TAN' dividing line, GAL representing green/alternative/libertarian values, TAN tradition/authority/nation. These findings are based on previous research, e.g. of Inglehart who predicted the joining of forces of traditional workers with conservative ideas (Inglehart 1971: 992). If we arrange the conflicting poles for new and old party systems in a fourfold table, we see the changes.

Chart 1: Competition in old and new party



x: economic axis, allocation by market vs. state; y: political axis, liberal or authoritarian allocation of values.

In the old, ‘frozen’ party systems of Western Europe conservatives, liberals and social democrats/socialists formed the center, and the bulk of voters was centered. As nationalists and communists were outside the main axis of party competition, they failed to organize considerable electoral support beyond the group of party members and activists. In some of the new type party systems the main field of party competition changed form and direction. More voters are situated at the edges, and the competitive axis turned, sometimes close to 180 degrees. Old parties of the old center tend to move outside this axis; or: the axis moves away from the old parties. They lose support subsequently and make way for new formations in the TAN and GAL corner of competition.

The party system in ECE-countries, however, never resembled the old, ‘frozen’ structure based on cleavages in the sense of Lipset/Rokkan:

- 1) The employer vs. worker cleavage seems to have played no role for the structuring of ECE party systems at all, as there were no employers in the socialist systems. Trade unions as workers’ associations remained weak all over the region ever since. Today, 30 years after the high time of political and economic transition, the employer’s side is dominated by multinational companies (green field investment), thus adding an international dimension to the relationship of employers and employees. It is not surprising that Viktor Orbán’s election campaigns included sharp rhetoric against the multinationals, and some actions, e.g. in the housing crisis and against the domination of foreign companies in the energy sector, just to mention a few. As a counter concept, emphasis in economic policies was put on Hungarian national champions.
- 2) The religious-secular cleavage church vs. state may have played a certain role in traditionally catholic Poland, but not in the rest of the region. But even in Poland this cleavage may be only attached to a territorial dividing line, as the more rural an electorate in Poland, the bigger the number of church attendants and the stronger the support for PiS.
- 3) The urban-rural and central periphery cleavages were less important in the founding elections around 1990, but gained importance soon after. Meanwhile they form the central dividing line between parties programmatically anchored in the TAN and GAL camps.
- 4) In the first phase of system change and during the first, sometimes the second round of parliamentary elections, ‘ancient regime’ vs. ‘democratic opposition’ was the central dividing line and major factor for the structuring of the party system, but lost importance soon after. In most countries of the region the old communist party is marginalized, making space for new formations, or reformed itself in the GAL direction, so that the territorial cleavages could gain ground.⁵
- 5) Traditional ‘left-right’ distinction never explained party competition in ECE countries. Neither were new ‘rightist’ parties always in favor of market-based economic reforms, nor were ‘leftist’ parties always in favor of allocation by the state. Instead, some ECE party systems already during party system formation showed signs of a TAN-GAL distinction, such as in Hungary, where the Socialists backed privatization and, from

⁵ An exception is the Hungarian MSZP, still one of the major competitors in the Hungarian party system.

1995⁶, shock therapy based on the Washington consensus.⁷ As a long-term result, former socialist workers in declining regions support to a large extent right-wing Jobbik. In Poland Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz pushed ahead market-based reforms from the very beginning and the Polish Socialists did little to turn it around after their electoral victory.

Territorial cleavages may be deeply embedded in the cultures of the ECE-6⁸ and reflect patterns of general societal formation, as Pisicotta (2016) describes them. Without denying the explanatory value of such an approach, my argumentation is more structural than cultural, more economic and rationally interest based. The absence of the employer vs. worker cleavage explains to a certain extent the weakness of classical left-wing parties in the ECE-region. They were successful as long as they represented urban and liberal values and still managed to organize support from unskilled workers. Meanwhile, the two groups are detached and left-wing parties are unable to develop a programmatic uniting both groups under a joint umbrella. In trying to do so, they lose both groups, opening up spaces for parties – on the one hand – favoring green and liberal urban values without paying tribute to the layer of society being left behind, and – on the other hand – right-wing parties praising a strong state as solution the problems of the latter. Here ECE was ‘forerunner’. The more classical employer-worker-relationships are challenged by globalization and digitalization, the more Western European party system will and are following this trend.

4. The territorial dimension of globalization

During the democratic turn in the late 1980s, ECE countries were catapulted into a Western world entering a phase of accelerated globalization. ‘Reagonomics’ and ‘Thatcherism’ led to the formalization of market based, neo-liberal reforms based on the Washington consensus. Differences in the reform approaches of ECE-countries at the date of departure⁹ were bulldozed to compliance with this blueprint. Due to strong green field investments most of the countries of the region were included into the German economic ‘steam engine’ as extended workbenches, with strong emphasis on the automotive industries and mechanical engineering. Investment and employment grow alongside highway construction, especially close to the territorial corridors defined by the European Union. In 2019, thirty years after the cumulation of the transformation, countries like Hungary (rank 12), Czech Republic (rank 15) and Estonia (rank 20) are among the most globalized countries in the world.¹⁰ In terms of economic growth the region became leading in the EU, particularly in the aftermath of the economic crisis of 2008, as the following map shows.

Map 1: Economic growth in the EU, 2008-2015


⁶ Since the ‘Bokros-package’, named after the finance minister Lajos Bokros of MSZP, the main protagonist of radical market-based reforms.

⁷ A set of ten policy proposals of international institutions such as World Bank and IMF providing a blueprint for macroeconomic transformation worldwide.

⁸ Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria.

⁹ Such as the gradual approach of the first freely elected government in Hungary vs. an approach following “shock therapy” under Balcerowicz in Poland.


¹⁰ According to the KOF globalization index, see <https://www.statista.com/statistics/268168/globalization-index-by-country/> - retrieved 2019/01/20.



Source: European Commission: Seventh report on economic, social and territorial cohesion, p. xiii – https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/cohesion7/7cr.pdf, retrieved 2019/02/11.

This looks, at first sight, like a success story. The more puzzling is the fact that some governments turned their back on the democratic political and market-based economic systems by demolishing pillars of the democratic constitution, attacking the freedom of the press, the independence of the courts, by gerrymandering the electoral laws beyond reason, by using state institutions to get their feet into the economic sphere by restricting competition and fostering corruption. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index (Bertelsmann 2018) shows that most parameters of democratic consolidation, and policy performance in central policy areas strongly connected with democracy and open societies declined in ECE countries. In this ‘illiberal drift’ (see following chart) the stability of democratic institutions declined.

Chart 2: Democratic backdrop in ECE’s democratic status




Source: Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2018.

But in stark contrast to rising political apathy, an anti-parliamentary – but still democratic – protest culture took to the streets in 2017-2018.¹¹ This is a clear sign that many voters do not feel represented in the democratic institutions anymore. This group of people, often young, well-educated and urban (the GAL pole) faces elderly, less educated layers of society mostly based in (declining) rural areas.

How did undemocratic, populist movements manage to take over the political discourse in the region. To my understanding, one of the reasons is a big rift between the urban and rural milieus. And this rift is connected to the nature of transition and framed by globalization. Research of the KOF-institute detects accelerated *de facto* globalization accompanied by less dense *de jure* globalization in the economic sphere. The ratio between *de jure* and *de facto* globalization in the social and the political sub-systems are the opposite. From this follows that society – or at least large parts of the society – may be exposed to challenges to follow economic globalization with respect to qualification (lifelong learning, linguistic skills) and mobility.

Chart 3: De jure & de facto globalization

¹¹ Such as protest against the murder of a journalist in Slovakia, against corruption in Romania, against the so-called “slave law” in Hungary (labor law), and the protests in Poland against several measures of the PiS-government. In Western Europe climate change and internet regulation brought (young) people to the street (more GAL-driven), and the Gilet Jaune movement (more TAN-driven) gained momentum.



Source: Savina Gygli, Florian Haelg, Jan-Egbert Sturm: *The KOF Globalisation Index – Revisited*, Zurich, Feb. 2018.

5. The attitude–voting gap

Attitudes towards the EU in ECE countries do often not resemble anti-EU voting. The trust in European institutions in general is still higher than in national institutions (parliament and government), but not overly good in general. Trust of the ECE-6 is above EU-28 average, distrust succeeds only in Czech Republic over trust. If the question is not trust but ‘positive’ image, the results are even clearer pro-EU, only, again, Czechs reporting a negative image. In countries with a strong EU-sceptic agenda like Poland and Hungary the EU’s image is even very good.

In all countries save Portugal and Sweden immigration was voted as number one problem the EU is facing. In the ECE-6 the numbers are generally higher than EU-average (40%), with Czech Republic at the high end (58%) and Romania being the exception (25%) at the low end. With a domestic view, being asked what problems the country is facing, immigration plays a significantly lower role. Whereas unemployment is the dominant topic in Southern Europe, Eastern Europeans complain about rising costs of living.

Table 1: Attitudes towards the European Union

| Question | PL | CZ | SK | HU | RO | BG | EU-28 |
|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Trust in EU (yes/no) | 47:41 | 32:58 | 43:47 | 48:48 | 50:41 | 53:30 | 42:48 |
| Image of EU (pos/neg) | 54:10 | 28:32 | 33:17 | 43:19 | 52:10 | 56:17 | 43:20 |
| Most important issues EU is facing: Immigration | 43 | 58 | 48 | 54 | 25 | 51 | 40 |

| | | | | | | | |
|--|-------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|-------|
| Most important issues the country is facing: cost of living (rank/%) | 1./42 | 1./41 | 1./32 | 2.*/29 | 1./37 | 1./48 | 2./21 |
| Current situation of the European economy (good/bad) | 70:19 | 54:30 | 56:33 | 65:29 | 56:31 | 54:18 | 49:38 |
| Current situation of the national economy (good/bad) | 68:26 | 69:29 | 46:48 | 54:44 | 25:72 | 18:72 | 49:48 |
| You feel being a citizen of the EU | 79 | 56 | 77 | 80 | 68 | 51 | 71 |

Numbers in %; * Hungary: Health care No 1.

Source: European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 90, Autumn 2018.

This positive attitude towards the EU may be the result of the positive economic development, higher incomes and rising purchasing power in the region, leading to the present boom in construction and rising import of quality goods in the Visegrád-4¹². In these countries there is little leeway between the perception of the European and the national economy, whereas a big gap divides the perception of national and European economy in Romania and Bulgaria. When asking about the feeling of being EU-citizen, it is, again, the two countries with strong EU-sceptic voting peaking at 80% (Hungary) and 79% (Poland).

Table 2 shows attitudes towards more recent problems. People in ECE-6 see corruption as a big problem, but only 35 percent of Hungarians find it unacceptable and only Romanians really feel personally affected. There are widespread concerns about a possible misuse of personal data, but the fear of disinformation campaigns is not as distinct. Given the strength of populist movements in the region, this is either a sign of ignorance, or the sign of a devaluation of the concept of democracy, basic freedoms and the rule of law.

Table 2: Selected problems in the ECE-6

| Question | PL | CZ | SK | HU | RO | BG | EU-28 |
|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 1. Corruption is unacceptable | 64 | 47 | 44 | 35 | 58 | 61 | 70 |
| 2. How widespread is corruption in your country (widespread) | 68 | 84 | 85 | 86 | 80 | 83 | 58 |
| 3. Are you personally affected by corruption, yes | 30 | 19 | 42 | 26 | 68 | 27 | 25 |
| 4. Concern about misuse of personal data for political purposes | 64:33 | 57:37 | 57:34 | 75:23 | 71:22 | 67:24 | 67:28 |
| 5. Satisfied with the freedom of speech | 74:23 | 62:35 | 62:31 | 59:38 | 56:39 | 56:36 | 69:27 |
| 6. Satisfied with the fight against disinformation in the media | | 33:60 | 34:54 | 45:49 | 36:56 | 34:53 | 40:52 |
| 7. New movements directed at the old elites are a matter of concern; yes | 68 | 58 | 71 | 66 | 70 | 53 | 67 |

Numbers in %; Sources: European Commission: Special Eurobarometer 470, October 2017/Q.1-3; Special Eurobarometer 477, September 2018 /Q.4-6; Special Eurobarometer 479, October/November 2018/Q.7.

As long as apathy prevails or government propaganda manages to redirect the problems (they have created themselves or failed to solve) towards perceived external enemies (Brussels, Soros), change is unlikely. Such downright ‘Kádarian’ apathy is a necessity of populist movements to stay in power once they achieved parliamentary majority but failed to produce

¹² Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia.


improvement in central policies such as health care or housing. They have to mobilize to gain power, but they have to demobilize to stay in power. This opens up a space for alternative populist and anti-EU parties and movements in the populist TAN-camp, such as Jobbik in Hungary or Kukiz'15 in Poland.

6. The territorial dimension of ECE populism and anti-EU voting

Regional policies of the European Union often followed an approach to assist mobility of the workforce, applying the motto: bring people to where the work is, not the other way around; this is, to the urban centers, especially the capital cities. However, such approaches so far did not moderate regional disparities in the region. In the ranking of the richest regions of the EU Bratislava (rank 6, 184% of EU-average GDP) and Praha (rank 7, 182%) are in the top ten. The poorest regions stretch from Poland to Greece, with Severozapaden (BG, 29%) at the bottom end. The spread between the richest and the poorest regions (NUTS-2) in Bulgaria is 47 (78-29), in Poland 46 (94-48), in Hungary 57 (102-45), and in Czech Republic 121 (182-63).

In ECE countries regional disparities are deeper than in the 'West', as is the gap of tertiary education between the central and peripheral areas. Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria show the biggest deviations, accompanied only by Denmark. In addition, most of Western countries are multipolar, whereas in ECE-countries the capital city dominates clearly.

Chart 4: Population aged 25-64 with tertiary education, 2016




Source: European Commission: Seventh report on economic, social and territorial cohesion, p. xiii – https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/cohesion7/7cr.pdf, retrieved 2019/02/11.

7. Some electoral data

The definition of party-base clusters in the Hungarian parliamentary election shows the Anti-EU party Jobbik with a strong cluster in the underdeveloped areas of Eastern Hungary in general and in the formerly industrialized but declining areas of North-East Hungary in particular.

Map 2: Clusters in the Hungarian parliamentary elections 2018




Source: Vida/Kovalcsik 2018: 21, based on Hungarian electoral office data.

The traditional left-wing parties (MSZP and DK) have clusters in urban centers, especially in the capital city Budapest. They attract predominantly the urban GAL milieus and are decoupled from declining areas. In such areas, voter's support often moved directly from the left-wing parties to the extremist, anti-EU right wing. The analysis of Vida/Kovalcsik (2018:24) report growing evidence of the urban-rural cleavage between Hungarian parliamentary elections of 2014 and 2018. And this holds true especially for FIDESZ-voters, providing an explanation why the big governing party and PM Orbán pushed anti-EU-sentiments so strongly over the past few years: the rural resonance room with its lesser educated, older and more nationalistic electorate more and more is the backbone of Orbán's power base.

In Poland, the already 'traditional' divide of a more industrialized, urban and economically prospering A-Poland (the West) and a more rural and economically backward B-Poland (the East) was visible during the last elections (parliamentary and presidential). The stronger an area economically and the more urban, the lower the support for PiS and the stronger for PO.

Maps 3: Parliamentary and presidential elections in Poland



Sources:

https://www.reddit.com/r/europe/comments/3qgady/results_of_the_polish_parliamentary_election_2015/ & <https://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/p/poland/poland-presidential-election-2015.html>, retrieved 25.03.2019.

8. Conclusions

Anti-EU-voting is visibly and measurably growing for quite some time. In other countries (e.g. US, Brexit-Britain) the party systems turned or are in the process of turning away from the classical left-right divide, towards an axis of party competition between the Poles GAL and TAN. Note: While the GAL-Pole is “conservative” in so far, as it supports the existing liberal progression towards open societies and market-based economies, the TAN-pole is reactionary, as it wants to overcome the existing progression and turn the clock back. The last sentence alone shows how traditional expressions fail to describe the present processes, they are semantically contradictory.

Anti-EU-voting has to be seen in coincidence with movements like the Gilet Jaunes, Brexit, and others aiming at bringing back the nation state as safeguard for social protection and as regulatory force withstanding the pressures of globalization and marketization. It is the young, the educated, the mobile against the elderly, lesser educated, the immobile, or, the urban Latte Macchiato-drinkers against the rural beer drinkers, plus the center against the periphery. Economic and infrastructure indicators show where the problems are located, but the reactions of existing “mainstream”/GAL-based governments so far failed to react adequately by investment in rural infrastructure, better education and the reform of labor markets. Incumbent TAN-based governments have not reached any substantive changes either, and they blame this on GAL-pole representatives, celebrating their anti-rhetoric and missing the point by trying to cure the shortcomings of the Washington consensus by a retrospective of traditional family values and the praise for the nation state who actually is too big to solve the small problems and too small to solve the small problems. This will not produce economic welfare.

Eastern- and Central Europe is to a certain extent the forerunner in the development of a TAN-GAL-pol in electoral behavior. Regional differences in development are higher in ECE-countries than in the rest of the European Union and the party systems never were frozen. Still, poverty (Eastern Europe) is not the same as decline (Southern Europe). The frustrations rooted in decline may turn out to be deeper cutting than those of persisting poverty. But as the region ECE slowly catches up economically, it is not unlikely that protest voting and anti-EU sentiments cannibalize themselves.

References

- Bertelsmann-Foundation (2018). Bertelsmann Transformation Index, <https://www.bti-project.org/en/home/>
- Eurobarometer, several issues
- European Commission (2013). The urban and regional dimension of the crisis. Eighth progress report on economic, social and territorial cohesion, Brussels, June

- European Commission: Seventh report on economic, social and territorial cohesion
- Fitzgerald, Jennifer (2018). *Close to Home: Local Ties and Voting Radical Right in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Gyárfášová Olga (2017). The EU Agenda as an Emerging Cleavage of Political Competition? Parties and Their Voters in Slovakia. In: Boicu R., Branea S., Stefanel A. (eds.): *Political Communication and European Parliamentary Elections in Times of Crisis. Political Campaigning and Communication*, London: Palgrave Macmillan
- Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2018). 'Cleavage theory meets Europe's crises: Lipset, Rokkan, and the transnational cleavage', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 25:1, pp. 109–135.
- Inglehart, R. (1971): The silent revolution in Europe: intergenerational change in post-industrial societies, *American Political Science Review* 65:4, pp. 991-1017.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin; Rokkan, Stein (1967). *Party systems and voter alignments: cross-national perspectives*. Free Press
- Linden, Ronald & Lisa Pohlman (2003). Now you see it, now you don't: anti-eu politics in central and Southeast Europe, *Journal of European Integration*, 25:4, 311-334
- Marcinkiewicz, Kamil (2018): The Economy or an Urban–Rural Divide? Explaining Spatial Patterns of Voting Behaviour in Poland, in: *East European Politics and Societies* 32:4, pp. 693-719.
- Marks, Gary and Wilson, Carole J. (2000). The Past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory of Party Response to European Integration, in: *British journal of Political Science* 30, pp. 433-459
- Massetti, Emanuele and Schakel, Arjan H.: From class to region: How regionalist parties link (and subsume) left-right into centre-periphery politics. *Party Politics*, 21:6, pp. 866-886
- Pisciotta, Barbara (2016). The Center-Periphery Cleavage Revisited: East and Central Europe from Postcommunism to Euroscepticism, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 22:2, 193-219
- Putnam, Robert D., Leonardi, Robert, and Nanetti, Raffaella Y. (1994). *Making Democracy Work. Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press
- Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés (2018). The revenge of the places that don't matter (and what to do about it), *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, Volume 11, Issue 1, 10 March, Pages 189–209
- Santana, Andrés and Rama, José (2018). Electoral support for left wing populist parties in Europe: addressing the globalization cleavage, *European Politics and Society*, 19:5, pp. 558-576
- Schakel, Arjan H. et al. (2018). Regional and national elections in Eastern Europe: Territoriality of the vote in 10 countries, in: *Czech Journal of Political Science*, 25:1, pp. 82-84
- Vida György and Kovalcsik, Tamás (2018). Magyarország választási földrajzi sajátosságai a 2014-es és a 2018-as parlamenti választások tükrében, in: *Modern Geográfia* 4, pp. 15-30
- Zarycki, Tomasz (2015). The electoral geography of Poland: Between stable spatial structures and their changing interpretations, in: *Erdkunde*, 69:2, pp. 107-124